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ABSTRACT
We examine the relationship between federal transfers, the existence of a
wage premium for the public sector and its effects on private wages in
Argentina. The empirical analysis is based on the theoretical presumption
that federal fiscal transfers to the different regions are being used to finance
more public employment therefore discouraging private activity. The
results suggest that the public sector pays a wage premium relative to the
private sector. This premium is increasing in the level of per capita federal
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transfers. There is no evidence of an overall positive effect on wages in
the private manufacturing sector. However, we find a significant positive
relationship between federal transfers and wages paid to workers with
less formal education; for jobs requiring a technical or professional
qualification the relationship is negative. These results broadly support
the hypothesis that the private sector faces harder competition in the
labour market in provinces which receive larger transfers from the
central government.
Keywords: Inter-governmental Transfers; Labour Markets; Wage premium;
Fiscal Policy
JEL Codes: H77, J31, J45, R11.
RESUMEN
Se examina la relación entre transferencias federales, la existencia de un
premio salarial en el sector público y sus efectos sobre los salarios privados
en Argentina. El análisis empírico se basa en la presunción teórica que las
transferencias fiscales desde el gobierno federal se utilizan para financiar
mayor empleo público desincentivando la actividad privada. Los resultados
sugieren que el sector público paga un premio salarial. Este premio es
creciente en el nivel de transferencias por habitante. No hay evidencia de
un efecto agregado positivo sobre los salarios privados. Sin embargo se
encuentra una relación positiva y significativa entre transferencias y los
salarios pagados a trabajadores con menor educación, para trabajos que
requieren una calificación técnica ó profesional la relación es negativa.
Los resultados apoyan, en general, la hipótesis que el sector privado
enfrenta una mayor competencia en los mercados de trabajo en aquellas
provincias que reciben mayores transferencias desde el gobierno central.
Palabras clave: Transferencias Intergubernamentales; Mercados de Trabajo;
Premio Salarial; Política Fiscal.
Códigos JEL: H77, J31, J45, R11.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the long-standing presence of a system of fiscal transfers
aimed at ensuring redistribution among provinces with strong egalitarian
aims, there are no signs that the pre-existing differences in levels of develop-
ment for the different regions are receding. In a previous paper, we argued
that it was precisely the existence of a system of statutory federal transfers
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with the specifics of the Argentine case that was behind this situation. In
an earlier empirical investigation, Capello and Figueras (2007) and
Capello et al. (2008) found evidence suggesting a non-benevolent behaviour
in the application of federal transfers by provincial governments. More
specifically, they show that transfers are primarily used for hiring staff
contrary to what is predicted by the literature on benevolent governments,
namely a reduction of the legal tax burden in the administrations receiving
the federal funds. In any case, there would seem to exist a reduction on the
de facto effective tax burden possibly due to the existence of lowered
incentives to collect local taxes efficiently.
One likely explanation for the persistent development gap between
rich and poor Argentine provinces is that the latter, despite receiving the
largest amount of transfers, have failed to channel these resources into
profitable activities in the private sector. In this sense, Capello and
Figueras (2007) and Capello et al. (2008) found that from 1991 to 1998 the
Argentine provinces that received the largest transfers per capita were
among the worst performers when considering the production of industrial
manufactures. The authors explain that this situation may be due to a
Dutch-disease type of phenomenon. More specifically, they contend that
this phenomenon is rooted in the system of federal transfers and is further
aggravated by the way these funds are applied by sub-national governments.
In this way, there is a quite evident paradox: while the system of inter-govern-
mental transfers provides greater spending capacity to the subsidized
provinces, it indirectly discourages industrial production due to distortions
arising from the regional labour markets. The persistence of this situation
has significant negative effects on regional growth and has additional
implications for the catch-up process. In this paper, we focus on this
channel, particularly studying the effects of the transfer system on the
conditions of the labour market.
II. FISCAL POLICY, REGIONAL ECONOMIES AND PRIVATE WAGES.
Several previous papers (Figueras 1992; Figueras 2008; Figueras
et al. 2009) have stressed that regional economies face a significant external
constraint which represents a major obstacle for reducing unemployment.
Although it is difficult to estimate this effect empirically since it is not
possible to measure the geographic GDP using the expenditure method, the
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intuition behind it will become evident. This regional external constraint
has its origin in structural factors, the most important being the lack of
regional competitiveness (the argument is similar for the national external
constraint). The lack of competitiveness is due to several factors:
• low rate of investment in physical capital and poor quality of
human capital
• low degree of economic openness
• the existence of an oversized public sector
• resource flight (capital, labour)
Various measures have been implemented from both the national
and sub-national governments to help alleviating the regional constraint.
Most of these were fiscal measures and often entailed increases in the
number of civil servants and of course, the expenses of their payroll in the
regions. The result was a steady increase in sub-national deficits which
eventually meant that the national government was forced to bail out on
those provinces dealing with fiscal troubles.1 This situation echoes the
predictions of the literature on the effects of fiscal policy on investment
and production. In an influential paper, Alesina et al. (2002) develop a
model where fiscal policy, in the form of higher public employment
or higher wages, creates wage pressure for the private sector. More
specifically, the authors specify a labour market channel through which
increases in public wages or employment put upward pressure on private
wages thereby discouraging private investment and production. The
theoretical basis of our analysis results from embedding this idea into a
regional economics framework.
In terms of a two-region setup with competitive product markets,
for profits to be equal regardless of location, it is necessary that firms
compensate higher transport costs with lower production costs -usually
via lower wages or tax deductions. In this way, firms will find it profitable
to invest in less developed regions which, in this case, will attract more
labour -perhaps in response to wage differentials. However, if this
1. In this paper, we do not elaborate on a related issue, namely the political economy problem
that arises from the financial dependence on the national government and the likely political
constraints borne by the sub-national administrations.
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compensation is absent or insufficient, then activity will likely concentrate
away from the less developed region and around the main industrial hub.
A similar two-region setup was suggested in Figueras (1991) and
Díaz Cafferata et al. (1999) who distinguished two different territorial
regions in the context of the Argentine republic: the richer industrial coastal
strip, which they labelled “Franja Industrial del Litoral” (or FIL) covering
from La Plata to Rosario and the poorer interior regions known as
“Economías Regionales del Interior” (or ERI). This distinction is important
since both regions have experienced different fortunes especially in the
last twenty years.2 In particular, one aspect where these two regions were
in sharp contrast is the unemployment rates. The ERI’s saw an important
increase in their average unemployment rates during the 90’s which, we
argue, was due (at least partly) to the insufficient compensation in the form
of wage differentials. This eventually led to active fiscal policies intended
to alleviate the mounting social pressure; as noted above, largely these
policies amounted to increasing public employment in the ERI’s (see
Porto (1989)), further lowering relative prices and damaging regional
competitiveness.3
The persistence of these policies not only affected sub-national
budgets but also produced several distortions in regional labour markets.
With competitive markets and mobile labour, we expect regions to converge
in income (Hirschman (1958)). The main reason is that the existence of wage
differentials between the regions is likely to stimulate labour mobility
from markets with infinitely inelastic labour supply (Baumol markets) to
markets with infinitely elastic labour supply (Lewis markets).4 However,
if there are institutional constraints, the predicted mobility may not result.
One such type of institutional constraint is the existence of unions and
regulations that may affect the characteristics of the labour markets (i.e.
for instance, having Lewis-type markets behaving as Baumol-type markets;
see Llach (1988) for details).
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2. Besides this, in the economic history, their performances were very different too, nevertheless
this interesting point will not be discussed in this paper.
3. The economic crisis that many Argentine provinces suffered through the 90’s was partly
the result of the decision of the national government to put on indefinite hold the fondos
compensatorios (inter-jurisdictional transfers) that were regularly used for bailing out sub-national
governments. This produced a severe contraction in aggregate demand in many provinces that
added to the crisis in some regional products resulting in a sharp rise in unemployment levels.
4. In Lewis markets, changes in the demand for labour does not affect (nominal) wages
thereby allowing for the existence of quasi-rents of abundant labour and long-run growth, while
in Baumol-type markets changes in the demand for labour increase (nominal) wages. See Lewis
(1954) and Baumol (1967).
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With regards to the Argentine case, this implies that we should
expect labour mobility from low-wage regions, as Jujuy or Catamarca, to
high-wage regions, as Buenos Aires (see Table 1 for additional examples).
However, even if the evidence confirms that the wages in the ERI are
indeed lower than wages in the FIL (WERI<WFIL) as expected, it has
been suggested that the wage premium is not large enough to compensate
for the additional costs faced by provinces in the ERI region in addition to
the significant increase in the number of public employment.5 Similarly,
we observe that income per capita in the ERI region is lower than income
per capita in the FIL region (YERI<YFIL). As additional evidence, it has
also been documented that the growth in public employment in terms of
the economically active population (EAP) is higher in the ERI’s (see
Porto, 1989).
Our work goes along the same theoretical lines as those presented
in Alesina et al. (2002) but the focus here is on the effects of the allocation
of federal transfers on the regional markets and its implications for
manufacturing production. Several studies have examined this problem in
recent years. Marqués Sevillano and Rosselló Villalonga (2004) focus on
the effect of political variables on the regional levels of public employment.
They find that the central government increased the number of public jobs
in less favoured regions and particularly so in regions politically aligned
with the central government. In addition to this, Kessler and Lessmann
(2009) examine the relationship between interregional transfers and
regional disparities. They build a theoretical model where migration decisions
are distorted by the existence of positive federal transfers (i.e. migration
would take place in the right direction without federal transfers).
We argue that the main reason resource mobility failed to operate
in the predicted way was because the wage premium between both regions
was not sufficiently large. This was due to the following reasons:
• The existence of an integrated labour market where the benchmark
consisted of the national-level public wage –this wage is not related to the
marginal productivity of labour (Figueras, 1992).
• The emergence of labour demand with negative marginal
productivity, where the reserve price of labour is above the price that
would be consistent with the state of industrial development in the region.
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5. The existence of nationwide Baumol-type labour market is only sustainable for the region
receiving all the surplus (identified by Samir Amin as “the Center”) via relative prices (or internal
terms of trade) but not for the region giving up the surplus (named by Amin as “the periphery”).
That fact that wages in both regions were not related with marginal
productivity but rather with institutional factors, prevented the existence of
a significant wage premium that would have encouraged labour mobility
and investment in the ERI’s and therefore further delayed industrialization
in these regions. Some authors have explored the occurrence of this
phenomenon and its implications from a regional economics perspective.
For instance, Figueras (1991) develops a simple microeconomic framework
to study the spatial effects of industry concentration arising from regions
with identical wages and productivity differentials. There is also empirical
evidence supporting this hypothesis for the United States (Kaufman and
Foran (1971)).
Our central idea is also supported by the view that inter-jurisdictional
transfers can cause a fall in the “regional” real exchange rate, as it is well
documented in the literature. Usually known as the transfer paradox, this
has the effect of removing (or at least alleviating) a region’s budget
restriction6 and ultimately affecting its regional competitiveness through
discouraging productive activities. One important exception to this situation
is the case presented by Balassa (1964), when there is an increase in the
productivity of tradable goods without any loss of competitiveness despite
the increased transfers.
III. THE REGIONAL LABOUR MARKET
Despite there being a chronic excess of labour supply in the ERI’s,
this does not seem to have resulted in a lower wage and a higher amount of
resources attracted to the poorer regions. If this process had operated as
theoretically expected, it would have stimulated higher investment and
growth helping to close the income gap between the FIL and the ERI
regions. We argue that this process did not take place due to several
institutional features of the Argentine labour markets like:
• Migration alleviating regional markets. Migration took place
from the periphery (known also as ERI) to the centre (FIL) thus alleviating
the pressures on regional labour markets preventing the operation of Lewis
markets at the regional level. In the FIL, in turn, owing to the presence of
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6. This phenomenon has been studied mainly within the context of international capital move-
ments, although more recently several authors have pointed to a similar effect within the national
boundaries.
an integrated labour market (Baumol market), there remained supply
deficiencies and this helped foster unionisation.
• The existence of a growing demand for labour by regional public
administrations. Increased federal transfers to the sub-national administrations
stimulated higher demand for labour, mainly from the public sector. The
result was relatively high wages (higher than productivity wages) and high
reserve wages (higher than those that would exist without the transfers) in
the provinces.7
• The gradual integration of regional labour markets into a single
nationwide labour market. This had the effect of raising wages in the
periphery to levels similar to that of the centre despite the latter having a
higher productivity per capita. This is the reason why wages historically
deviate from the marginal productivity condition and are instead determined
attending to sociological reasons. Pressure from labour unions is such that
labour markets end up behaving as a single nationwide market (this is
specially so when public employment increases and wages are set with
reference to the public wages at the national level). In this case, sectoral
and spatial segmentation, typical of Lewis markets, are absent. In fact, the
country as a whole behaves as a nation-wide Baumol labour market.8
Further evidence of this phenomenon is provided by Capello and
Ponce (1997) where the authors suggest that those provinces receiving the
largest transfers per capita have a higher share of public officials as a fraction
of their population. Furthermore, the authors provide evidence suggesting
that the larger the federal transfers the larger the per capita spending on
public payroll. This work provides relevant insights and serves as an
additional motivation for exploring the labour market channel in the
relationship between transfers and industrial production. Thinking along
similar lines, in this work we explore the hypothesis that there exists a
public wage premium relative to the private sector; in other words,
whether people employed in the public sector earn on average higher
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7. Remember that in Baumol markets with infinitely inelastic supply of labour, wages rise in
response to an increase in demand for labour.
8. This structural characteristic of labour markets prevents convergence from taking place
since it does not stimulate higher capital accumulation in the ERI. Following Kaldor, this is a
situation known as (relative) wage efficiency which we could naturally generalize to the case of
other factors also defined similarly to WERI < WFIL. Given that productivity is known to be
lower in the ERI, this situation inevitable leads to higher economic growth in the FIL (Figueras
and Ponce (1998), Figueras (2008), Richardson (1977)).
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wages than those employed in the private sector. Additionally, we also
explore the hypothesis that this public wage premium is influenced by the
amount of fiscal transfers received by the different regions.More specifically,
we explore whether fiscal policy by the central government, defined as
federal transfers to regional jurisdictions, has an effect on the public wage
premium. In other words, we examine whether the mechanism suggested
by Alesina et al. (2002), whereby fiscal policy often results in increases in
both the number and pay rate of public employees, is also relevant for the
case of interjurisdictional fiscal transfers. We also comment on the
implications that this may have regarding the expected and actual effects
of the system of federal transfers currently in place in Argentina. This is
important since despite the sustained transfers to the poorest provinces,
these have not been able to increase investment and balance their budgets
but have rather inflated their public sector by hiring additional workers,
increasing public wages or a combination of both.
IV. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Our previous research in this area covers a number of related
aspects to the present investigation from both a theoretical perspective
(Figueras, 1992; Figueras, 2008; Figueras and Ponce, 1998; Figueras et
al., 2009) and an empirical investigation (Capello and Ponce, 1997).
Specifically, some of the aspects related with the mechanism of the labour
market are studied in Figueras and Ponce (1998) and the positive relationship
between federal transfers and per capita public spending is examined in
Capello and Ponce (1997).
In this paper we bring together two areas: the relation between
transfers and public spending and the problem of regional labour markets.
The purpose in this paper is to examine the hypothesis that the existence of
a system of federal transfers is related with the labour market phenomenon
we have described earlier. More specifically, we will address two central
aspects: (a) given the existence of a wage premium in the public sector
relative to the private sector9, we will examine whether this premium is
positively related with the level of federal transfers received by the provinces
and (b) whether higher federal transfers have a positive effect on wages in
the private sector. Our goal is to find out whether there is empirical support
9. We use a broad definition of the public sector including not only workers in the public
administration but also those who claim to work in the public sector as registered in the EPH.
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for our main theoretical presumption of the detrimental effects of federal
transfers on the private sector through an increase in both the number and
the average pay of public employees.
To deal with these issues, we proceed by using the well-known
Mincer wage-equation. We first explore whether wages in the private
sector are on average lower than in the public sector and, if this is true,
whether it is due to personal characteristics or also to the fact that being
employed in the public sector is associated with a higher wage. Next, we
present our main hypothesis regarding the relationship between fiscal
transfers and public wages using an augmented Mincer equation to control
for the level of public transfers. Finally, we explore the issue whether
transfers have an effect on wages in the private sector. We are also interested
to see whether the effects of fiscal transfers on wages vary depending on the
level of educational attainment or qualification of workers.
IV.1. Does the Public Sector pay a wage Premium?
Table 1 shows public and private average wages between 1996
and 2002 for 29 urban areas where the Statistics and Census National
Institute (INDEC) carries out a Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente
de Hogares, EPH). Until the first semester of 2002, the EPH was surveyed
twice a year, May and October, since then, the EPHs methodology was
subject to major changes that make difficult to extend our period of analysis.
Additionally, this period is characterised by a relatively stable economic
structure allowing us to focus on the evolution of the differences between
public and private wages and the effect of transfers on this wage premium.10
The first clear outcome that emerges from Table 1 is that the average
hourly wage in the public sector is considerably higher than in the private
sector as a whole, from 32% in the Conurbano (the surrounding areas
around the city of Buenos Aires), to 111% in the case of Santiago del
Estero, capital of the province of the same name, and one of the poorest
provinces in Argentina. If the private sector is dividend among different
sub-sectors, primary, manufactures and other sectors, the results do not
vary much, only in three cases (Neuquen, Buenos Aires, and Río Gallegos)
the average wage in the public sector is lower than in the primary sectors,
10. The structural conditions were subject to significant changes after the 2001 crisis and the
effects of the devaluation in 2002.
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for all other cities and sectors, the average wage rate paid by the public
sector is higher. When comparing with the manufacturing sector, the one
we may assume is more likely to relocate between regions in responses to
differences in costs, the excess in the average wage paid by the public
sector goes from 23% in Bahia Blanca to a 121% in Posadas, city which is
also among the poorest in the country.
Table 1
Average hourly wage in the public and private sectors, 1996-2002
Source: own calculations based on Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH).
URBAN AREA PUBLICSECTOR
ALL
SECTORS
PRIMARY
SECTORS MANUFACT.
OTHER
SECTORS
BAHÍA BLANCA 4.69 3.35 2.45 3.82 3.26
CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES 7.49 5.39 9.05 5.83 5.29
COMODORO RIVADAVIA 5.54 3.90 5.90 3.35 3.55
CONCORDIA 3.72 2.15 1.64 2.20 2.22
CONURBANO 4.59 3.49 2.88 3.51 3.48
CORRIENTES 3.39 2.05 2.88 2.52 1.99
FORMOSA 3.58 1.82 1.88 1.82 1.81
GRAN CATAMARCA 4.16 2.20 2.43 2.20 2.20
GRAN CÓRDOBA 5.04 2.90 2.86 3.03 2.8
GRAN LA PLATA 4.75 3.54 2.78 3.76 3.52
GRAN MENDOZA 4.71 2.75 3.38 2.86 2.70
GRAN RESISTENCIA 4.30 2.19 1.64 2.03 2.21
GRAN ROSARIO 4.31 3.17 4.27 3.17 3.16
GRAN SAN JUAN 4.53 2.41 2.33 2.43 2.41
LA RIOJA 4.32 2.46 2.24 2.60 2.42
MAR DEL PLATA Y BATÁN 4.99 3.29 3.49 3.19 3.31
NEUQUÉN Y PLOTTIER 5.09 3.40 5.49 3.38 3.22
PARANÁ 4.19 2.63 1.94 2.55 2.65
POSADAS 4.50 2.21 2.94 2.04 2.22
RÍO CUARTO 5.05 2.70 2.54 2.37 2.76
RÍO GALLEGOS 6.07 3.73 6.83 3.02 3.45
S.M. DE TUCUMÁN Y TAFÍ VIEJO 4.41 2.43 2.69 2.53 2.41
SALTA 4.07 2.25 2.14 2.19 2.26
SAN LUÍS Y EL CHORRILLO 4.12 2.61 2.37 2.95 2.44
SAN S. JUJUY Y PALPALA 3.82 2.07 1.79 2.00 2.09
SANTA FE Y SANTO TOMÉ 4.58 2.86 1.26 2.87 2.86
SANTA ROSA Y TOAY 4.40 2.64 1.89 2.49 2.68
SGO. DEL ESTERO Y LA BANDA 4.41 2.09 2.34 2.15 2.08
TIERRA DEL FUEGO 7.92 4.73 5.91 5.75 4.35
PRIVATE SECTOR
52 MARCELO CAPELLO, ALBERTO FIGUERAS, SEBASTIÁN FREILLE, PEDRO MONCARZ
It should be noted that the fact that we find the average wage rate
in the public sector is higher than the wage rate paid by the private sector
does not necessarily mean the public sector is paying a wage premium,
these differences could be originated because public employees have
different characteristics to those of people working in the private sector.
Table 2 reports the mean values for different characteristics of workers
employed in the public and private sector. The main differences that may
contribute to explain the higher wages paid in the public sector are age,
and job tenure, which both are higher in the case of people working in the
public sector. Also, other characteristics with the same effect are the
proportion of people with higher formal education as well as being employed
for jobs that require a higher qualification, which also are higher in the
case of the public sector.
Table 2
Public and Private Employment Characteristics, Means 1996-2002
To go deeper into the question if higher wages in the public sector
are solely explained by differences in the characteristics of people employed
in the public sector vis à vis those who are employed in the private sector,
or if there is indeed a positive wage premium paid by the public sector, we
estimate aMincer-type wage equation where the wage rate paid to a person is
a function of her personal characteristics, as well as other variables, one of
which is a dummy variable controlling for the worker being employed or
not in the public sector. Through the interaction of this dummy variable
with other variables, such as formal education and the qualifications required
PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR
AGE (YEARS) 40.2 35.4
TENURE (YEARS) 10.5 5.3
MALE (%) 47.0 61.2
INCOMPLETE HIGH SCHOOL (%) 32.0 56.0
INCOMPLETE TERTIARY/UNIVERSITY (%) 34.0 34.0
COMPLETE TERTIARY/UNIVERSITY (%) 33.0 10.0
THE JOB REQUIRES NO QUALIFICATION (%) 13.0 33.0
THE JOB REQUIRES AN OPERATIVE QUALIFICATION (%) 36.0 48.0
THE JOB REQUIRES A TECHNICAL QUALIFICATION (%) 35.0 14.0
THE JOB REQUIRES A PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION (%) 16.0 5.0
Source: own calculations based on EPH
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by the job a person is employed for, we allow the wage premium to vary
across people with different characteristics. We estimate this wage
equation for each year in the period 1996-2002. More specifically, the
equation we estimate is the following:
(1)
where: wi is the hourly wage rate of worker i; AGE is the age of worker i,
in years;MALE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if worker i is male; TENURE
is a dummy variable to control for the worker tenure, the tenure periods, in
years, are: (1,2], (2,5], (5,10], (10, ...). The reference group is less or equal
than 1 year; EDUC denote dummy variables to control for the level of
formal education of worker i; the education groups are: complete high
school or incomplete tertiary/university (h=2), and complete
tertiary/university (h=3). The reference group (h=1) is incomplete high
school or less; PUB is a dummy variable equal to 1 if worker i is employed
in the public sector; and X is a set of dummy variables to control for place
of residence, sector of activity, and if the EPH was surveyed in October.
We also run equation 1 allowing for the interactions of the PUB dummy
with the three education dummies. Additionally, we estimate a second version
of the wage equation, but instead of using formal education to distinguish
between workers with different skills, we use four dummy variables which
control for the skills required by the job person i is employed for. In this case
the wage equation is as follow:
(2)
whereQUAL is a set of dummy variables to control for the skill requirements
of the job worker i is employed for. The dummies are: the job requires an
operative qualification (h=2); a technical qualification (h=3); or a professional
qualification (h=4). The reference group is the job requires no qualification
(h=1). As with equation 1, we run equation 2 allowing for the interactions
of the PUB dummy with the skill requirement dummies. The results of
equation 1 and 2 are summarized in Table 3. The upper bock of Table 3
reports the estimated wage premium when using equation 1. As the results
shows, after controlling for all other variables, there still exists a positive
and statistically significant wage premium of 7%-10% in favour of public
employees. However, this wage premium is much lower than the one
obtained when we just simply compare average wages of public and
private employees. When we allow for the wage premium to vary across
workers, depending on the level of formal education, the results shows that
the public sector wage premium is higher for workers with an intermediate
level of education. However, for the other two groups (incomplete high
school or less, and complete tertiary/university), the wage premium is still
positive and significant. In the lower block of Table 3, we present the
results when the wage equation is estimated using equation 2. Here again,
we obtain that overall, there is a positive wage premium favouring public
employees. If allowing for the wage premium to vary according to the skill
requirements of the job, we find out that this premium is higher for jobs
requiring a low qualification (no qualification and an operative qualification).
For jobs requiring a technical qualification the wage premium is also
positive, whilst the opposite outcome is obtained in the case of the most
skilled jobs, those which require a professional qualification, in this case
the public sector pays a statistically significant lower wage.
Table 3
Estimated Wage Premium
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CONTROLLING BY EDUCATION 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
WAGE PREMIUM (OVERALL) 6.6(a) 10.2(a) 9.8(a) 9.1(a) 8.8(a) 9.8(a) 10.0(a)
WAGE PREMIUM (INCOMPLETE HIGH SCHOOL) 6.9(a) 8.0(a) 8.8(a) 7.3(a) 8.6(a) 9.2(a) 11.5(a)
WAGE PREMIUM (INCOMPLETE TERTIARY/UNIVERSITY) 12.8(a) 15.9(a) 16.0(a) 11.8(a) 12.6(a) 14.1(a) 13.0(a)
WAGE PREMIUM (COMPLETE TERTIARY/UNIVERSITY) -1.6 6.7(a) 4.6(a) 8.4(a) 5.0(a) 6.1(a) 4.8(a)
CONTROLLING BY JOB SKILL REQUIREMENTS 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
WAGE PREMIUM (OVERALL) 5.7(a) 7.3(a) 7.6(a) 7.9(a) 6.2(a) 7.8(a) 6.3(a)
WAGE PREMIUM (NO QUALIFICATION) 3.9(b) 6.3(a) 10.6(a) 8.9(a) 7.5(a) 11.7(a) 13.1(a)
WAGE PREMIUM (OPERATIVE QUALIFICATION) 7.2(a) 8.9(a) 13.3(a) 13.8(a) 10.2(a) 12.7(a) 10.8(a)
WAGE PREMIUM (TECHNICAL QUALIFICATION) 13.0(a) 11.5(a) 5.2(a) 4.8(a) 6.5(a) 6.2(a) 2.1(a)
WAGE PREMIUM (PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION) -16.7(a) -8.9(a) -5.0(b) -0.3(a) -9.2(a) -8.0(a) -9.9(a)
(a) Significant at 1% level; (b) Significant at 5% level. Source: own calculations based on EPH
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IV.2. Public Sector Wage Premium and Vertical Fiscal Transfers
Once we have found evidence of a positive and significant
wage premium in favour of public employees, we now analyse how the
magnitude of the wage premium is affected by the level of transfers
provincial governments receive from the federal government. The
relevant concept here is that of net fiscal flows which deduct from the
transfers per capita to region i the amount of tax resources that are
originated in the same region and contributed to the tax pool. However,
data on net transfers is much more difficult to obtain due to the
methodological problems involved in its calculation. We were only
able to get data on gross transfers per capita to the regions for the full
period. However, we argue that there is a strong positive correlation
between gross transfers per capita and net fiscal flows. We find this
correlation to be high and significant for the period 2001-07 and for
2001-02 which coincides with the last two years in our sample. These
correlations are given in Tables 4a to 4c. Although we cannot be sure that
the same correlations are observed for the 1996-2002 period, given that
there have not been significant changes to the way taxes are collected
and transfers allocated in the last 25 years, we believe that our results
should not be qualitatively different if we used data on net fiscal flows.
Table 4a
Correlation Coefficients between Gross Per Capita Transfers and
Net Fiscal Flows
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NET FISCAL FLOWS
CO-PARTICIPATION 2001-2007
NET FISCAL FLOWS TOTAL
2001-2007
CO-PARTICIPATION TRANSFERS 2001-2007 0.85(a) 0.56(a)
NO. OBS 153 153
(a) Significant at the 1% level; (b) significant at the 5% level. Source: Data on Co-participation
Transfers from MECON. Data on net fiscal flows from Ruarte Bazan (2008).
Table 4b
Correlation Coefficients between Gross Per Capita Transfers and
Net Fiscal Flows
Table 4c
Correlation Coefficients between Gross Per Capita Transfers and
Net Fiscal Flows (alternative data)
Table 5 reports the level of per capita transfers from the national
government to provincial (local) governments. The first picture that emerges
clearly from the figures reported is that there exists a large dispersion across
provinces, with small and/or poor provinces receiving much higher transfers.
In Table 6 we report the Pearson correlation coefficients between the public
sector wages relative to wages in the private sector, and per capita income
transfers. With the exception of primary activities and current transfers, the
correlation coefficients are positive and statistically significant.
56 MARCELO CAPELLO, ALBERTO FIGUERAS, SEBASTIÁN FREILLE, PEDRO MONCARZ
NET FISCAL FLOWS TOTAL 2006
CO-PARTICIPATION TRANSFERS 2006 0.77(a)
NO. OBS 22
(a) Significant at the 1% level. Source: Data on Co-participation Transfers from MECON. Data
on net fiscal flows from Ruarte Bazan (2008).
NET FISCAL FLOWS
COPARTICIPATION 2001-02
NET FISCAL FLOWS TOTAL
2001-2002
CO-PARTICIPATION TRANSFERS 2001-2002 0.53(a) 0.29(b)
NO. OBS 42 42
((a) Significant at the 1% level; (b) significant at the 5% level. Source: Data on Co-participation
Transfers from MECON. Data on net fiscal flows from Ruarte Bazan (2008).
Table 5
Per Capita Income Transfers from the National Government:
Current 1996-2002 average*
To further analyse this relationship we estimate our Mincer wage
equation for the period 1996 to 2002, where the dummy controlling for
worker i being employed in the public sector is interacted with the variable
Transfers which measures per capita transfers from the National government
to province p the urban area c is located in. We use two definitions for the
variable Transfers, Total Tax Transfers, and Tax Transfers under the
co-participation regime:
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URBAN AREA TOTAL TAXTRANSFERS CO-PARTICIPATION
CURRENT
TRANSFERS
BAHÍA BLANCA 0.27 0.15 0.01
CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES 0.06 0.05 0.02
COMODORO RIVADAVIA 0.69 0.36 0.07
CONCORDIA 0.66 0.43 0.03
CONURBANO 0.27 0.16 0.01
CORRIENTES 0.62 0.40 0.04
FORMOSA 1.09 0.74 0.06
GRAN CATAMARCA 1.28 0.86 0.04
GRAN CÓRDOBA 0.43 0.29 0.02
GRAN LA PLATA 0.27 0.16 0.01
GRAN MENDOZA 0.40 0.26 0.02
GRAN RESISTENCIA 0.74 0.52 0.04
GRAN ROSARIO 0.44 0.29 0.02
GRAN SAN JUAN 0.86 0.57 0.06
LA RIOJA 1.17 0.75 0.86
MAR DEL PLATA Y BATÁN 0.27 0.15 0.01
NEUQUÉN Y PLOTTIER 0.60 0.33 0.09
PARANÁ 0.65 0.43 0.03
POSADAS 0.55 0.34 0.08
RÍO CUARTO 0.42 0.29 0.02
RÍO GALLEGOS 1.49 0.79 0.30
S.M. DE TUCUMÁN Y TAFÍ VIEJO 0.54 0.36 0.04
SALTA 0.56 0.36 0.05
SAN LUÍS Y EL CHORRILLO 1.02 0.65 0.03
SAN S. JUJUY Y PALPALA 0.73 0.46 0.10
SANTA FE Y SANTO TOMÉ 0.44 0.29 0.02
SANTA ROSA Y TOAY 1.01 0.62 0.10
SGO. DEL ESTERO Y LA BANDA 0.83 0.55 0.05
TIERRA DEL FUEGO 1.73 0.79 0.54
* Figures are total values for the Province the urban areas is located in. Source: MECON
Table 6
Correlation Coefficients between Public Sector Relative
Wages and Other Variables
(a) Significant at the 1% level; (b) significant at the 5% level; (c) significant at the 10% level.
Source: own calculations based on EPH and MECON
(3)
where TRp,t is the level of per capita transfer received by the province p
person i lives in. As with equation 1, equation 3 is also estimated allowing for
the interactions of with the education dummies.
Similarly to what we did before, we estimate an alternative version
of equation 3, but instead of using formal education to distinguish between
workers with different skills, we use the four dummy variables to control
for the skills required by the job person i is employed for:
(4)
As with equation 2, equation 4 is also estimated allowing for the
interactions of with the qualification dummies.
Both, in equations (3) and (4), for any two persons with the same
characteristics but the sector they work in, the change in the wage premium
(WP) for the public workers between two any periods t and t+j is given by:
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PRIVATE SECTORS TOTAL TAXTRANSFERS
CO-PARTICIPATION
REGIME
CURRENT
TRANSFERS
All Sectors 0.388(b) 0.520(a) 0.096
Primary Activ. -0.018 -0.096 -0.087
Manufactures 0.312(c) 0.424(b) 0.013
Other Sector 0.523(a) 0.619(a) 0.200
PUBLIC SECTOR
RELATIVE
WAGE WITH
RESPECT TO:
FEDERAL TRANSFERS INCOME (PER INHABITANT)
The first term on the RHS measures the change in the wage
premium due to other reasons than changes in transfers, while the second
term measures the change in the wage premium because of changes in
transfers. The expression for the change in WP needs to be adapted
accordingly when allowing for the interactions of with the
education and qualification dummies.
Table 7 reports the outcomes for different specifications of
equations 3 and 4. The first result that emerges is that the wage premium
paid by the public sector has increased regardless of the evolution of
public transfers: the coefficients λ1,t increase as time moves forward.
Additionally, this wage premium increases with the level of transfers
received from the Federal government (coefficient λ2 is positive and
statistically significant): a 1% increase in per capita transfers increases the
public sector wage premium between 0.07% and 0.10%. When allowing
for the effect of transfers to vary across workers with different education
levels, we have that an increase in the transfers from the national to local
governments has a positive and significant effect on the wage premium of
workers independently of their formal education, with this effect being
more important for workers with extreme skills. While for people with
incomplete tertiary/university studies a 1% increase in per capita transfers
raises the wage premium paid by the public sector by 0.04%-0.06%, for
workers with incomplete high school or less or with complete ter-
tiary/university the effect is twice as large, between 0.096%-0.11%. A
similar result emerges when workers are distinguished in terms of the skill
requirements of the job they do, now, a 1% increase in per capita transfers
increases more the public sector wage premium of jobs requiring the least
and most skilled workers (0.10% and 0.16% respectively) than for jobs
which require an operative or technical qualification (0.067% and
0.08% respectively).
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Table 7
OLS Regressions: Public wage premium and federal transfers
Note: Other included variables are age, male dummy, tenure dummies, education (skill) dummies, time dum-
mies, sector dummies, and city dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. (a) Significant at 1% level;
(b) significant at 5% level; (c) significant at 10% level. In (1) the transfer variable is Total national tax trans-
fers. In (2) the transfer variable is Tax
national transfer due to Co-participation regime
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VARIABLE (1) (1) (2) (2) (1) (1) (2) (2)
PUB (1996) 0.0838a 0.0841a 0.1340a 0.1347a 0.0736a 0.0725a 0.1299a 0.1255a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
PUB (1997) 0.0954a 0.0957a 0.1451a 0.1461a 0.0742a 0.0736a 0.1299a 0.1260a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
PUB (1999) 0.1202a 0.1206a 0.1675a 0.1686a 0.1009a 0.1002a 0.1541a 0.1499a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
PUB (1999) 0.1326a 0.1328a 0.1795a 0.1802a 0.1167a 0.1160a 0.1695a 0.1652a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
PUB (2000) 0.1396a 0.1399a 0.1844a 0.1849a 0.1234a 0.1228a 0.1739a 0.1700a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
PUB (2001) 0.1667a 0.1669a 0.2191a 0.2195a 0.1516a 0.1510a 0.2106a 0.2062a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
PUB (2002) 0.1724a 0.1736a 0.2302a 0.2315a 0.1462a 0.1456a 0.2112a 0.2059a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
TR*PUB 0.0770a 0.0903a 0.0841a 0.1003a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
TR*PUB*EDUC
(INCOMPHS) 0.0986
a 0.1066a
(0.005) (0.005)
TR*PUB*EDUC
(INCOMPTER) 0.0403
a 0.0558a
(0.004) (0.004)
TR*PUB*EDUC
(COMPTER) 0.0961
a 0.1114a
(0.005) (0.005)
TR*PUB*QUAL
(NOQUAL) 0.1007
a 0.1050a
(0.007) (0.006)
TR*PUB*QUAL
(OPERQUAL) 0.0723
a 0.0819a
(0.004) (0.004)
TR*PUB*QUAL
(TECHQUAL) 0.0675
a 0.0822a
(0.004) (0.004)
TR*PUB*QUAL
(PROFQUAL) 0.1227
a 0.1582a
(0.007) (0.006)
OBSERVATIONS 265,673 265,673 265,673 265,673 265,346 265,346 265,346 265,346
ADJUSTED R2 0.459 0.459 0.459 0.459 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.467
VI.3. Fiscal Transfers and Private Sector Wages
In the previous two sections we have shown that after controlling
for personal and other characteristics, the public sector pays a wage
premium relative to the wages paid by the private sector. This wage
premium increases with the level of per capita transfers from the national
government to local ones. In both cases, the results show that the effects
are larger for the least and most educated/skilled workers, with a lower
effect for workers with intermediate skills. These findings constitute
evidence favouring our hypothesis that the private sector confronts a
harder competition from the public sector at the moment of hiring employees
in those provinces which receive larger transfers from the central government.
This increasing competition from the public sector may help to explain
why in these provinces the importance of footloose activities, such as the
case of manufacturing production, is less important.11
The second issue we made reference at the beginning of this
section was related to the question if there is a relationship or not between the
level of transfers local governments receive from the federal administration,
and wage rates in the private sector, more specifically those sectors which
are more easily relocated among regions in the face of cost differentials,
such as manufactures. To deal with this question we estimate a Mincer
wage equation for workers employed in the manufacturing sector, and
include as explanatory variable the level of per capita transfers received by
the government of the province the worker live in. More specifically, we
estimate the following two equations:
(5)
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11. Excluding the province of San Luis, where the scheme of industry promotion has
been, under certain criteria, very successful, there exists a negative and statistically significant
correlation between Manufacturing GDP and Tax Transfers from the central government, both
measured in per capita values. Further more, if we also exclude the province of La Rioja, where
the large size of its manufacturing GDP is very suspicious considering other economic and social
variables, the negative correlation between Manufacturing GDP and Tax Transfers from the
central government becomes even stronger as well as more significant. When no province is
excluded, the correlation coefficients remain negative, but they lose their statistical significance.
(6)
As with the previous equations, we allow for our variable of interest
(TR) to interact with the education dummy variables (in the case of equation
5) and with the skill requirement dummies (in the case of equation 6). Table 8
reports the results from the estimation of equations 5 and 6. Overall, we find
no statistical relationship between the wage rate in the manufacturing sector
and transfers from the national to local governments. However, when we
distinguish between different types of workers, there is a positive and
significant effect of transfers on wages paid to workers with less formal
education (incomplete high school or less), for the other two groups the
coefficients are not significant. When workers are distinguished according to
the skills required by the job they do, there is a positive and, in one out of two
cases, significant relationship between transfers and wages for those jobs
requiring no qualification or an operative qualification. In the case of jobs
which requires more skilled workers, there is a negative and, in one out of
two cases, statistically significant effect for jobs that requires a technical
qualification. For the most skilled workers the estimated coefficients are not
statistically significant. These results means that, if any, vertical transfers
from the central government put a pressure on the wages paid by the private
sector to workers that are at the bottom of the skill distribution.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
One of the main objectives of inter-governmental fiscal transfers
in federal countries is to help alleviate regional disparities while laying the
foundations for sustainable economic growth in the poorest regions.
Similarly, theories from the regional economics literature predict that
lower wages in the provinces would lead to higher accumulation fostering
growth prospects. One striking observation in the Argentine context is
that, despite the existence of a long-standing system of inter-governmental
federal transfers and an excess labour supply in the poor provinces, there
are no signs of economic convergence between rich and poor regions
taking place.
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Table 8
OLS Regressions: Private (manufacturing)
wages and federal transfers. By education/skill level
Note: ohter included variables are age, male dummy, tenure dummies, education (skill) dummies, time dum-
mies, sector dummies, and city dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. (a) Significant at 1% level; (b)
significant at 5% level; (c) significant at 10% level. In (1) the transfer variable is Total national tax transfers.
In (2) the transfer variable is Tax national transfer due to Co-participation regime.
We argue that one likely explanation for this phenomenon is the
existence of institutional wages (as opposed to productivity wages) which
is explained by the prevalence of a nationwide labour market benchmark.
In these conditions, the wage differential between regions is either absent
or not large enough to stimulate investment and accumulation in the less
favoured provinces. In line with earlier work, we also argue that this situation
is the result of large federal transfers finding their way into the public
administration rather than into the private sector. In other words, the private
sector faces strong competition from the public sector in regional labour
markets and this further discourages private investment in the provinces.
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VARIABLE (1) (1) (2) (2) (1) (1) (2) (2)
TR 0.0369 -0.0001 0.0768 0.0270
(0.049) (0.033) (0.050) (0.033)
TR*EDUC
(INCOMPHS 0.0875(c) 0.0401
(0.049) (0.033)
TR*EDUC
(INCOMPTER) 0.0187 -0.0295
(0.049) (0.033)
TR*EDUC
(COMPTER) -0.0022 -0.0506
(0.051) (0.038)
TR*QUAL
(NOQUAL) 0.0942(c) 0.0344
(0.050) (0.035)
TR*QUAL
(OPERQUAL) 0.1100(b) 0.0491
(0.049) (0.033)
TR*QUAL
(TECHQUAL) -0.0226 -0.0863(b)
(0.050) (0.034)
TR*QUAL
(PROFQUAL) 0.0121 -0.0536
(0.053) (0.042)
OBSERVATIONS 30,844 30,844 30,844 30,844 30,809 30,809 30,809 30,809
ADJUSTED R2 0.420 0.422 0.420 0.422 0.409 0.412 0.409 0.412
We approach our theoretical predictions using a Mincer-type
equation. We find empirical support for our hypothesis that the public
sector pays a wage premium relative to the wages paid by the private
sector. As we expected, this premium is increasing in the level of federal
transfers per capita. We find no significant evidence suggesting that
federal transfers have an effect on wages in the private manufacturing
sector at the aggregate level. However, when we incorporate the level of
education and/or job qualification into the model, we find evidence
suggesting a significant and positive relationship between federal transfers
and wages paid to workers with less formal education or for jobs that
requires less skilled workers. This latter finding suggests another channel
through which large federal transfers discourage investment in the private
sector and particularly in those activities intensive in unskilled labour.
Overall, our results in this paper confirm previous results while
offering new light on the detrimental effects of an inter-governmental
transfer system when regional labour markets operate in much the same
way as the single nationwide labour market. Similarly, our findings go
some way towards explaining the persistence of regional differences and
the lack of economic convergence.
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